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Abstract. Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other
motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law
may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suer or inflict large losses.
This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes
cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of vehicles. Thus, the
Nash equilibrium and its degree of e!ciency depend on the liability regime.
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1. Introduction
As motivation for the present inquiry, recall the following somewhat stylized story:
Until unification of Germany, the East-German car pool comprised mostly inexpensive
species - such as the two-cylinder “Trabbi”. Soon thereafter, many a well-to-do
eastern citizen replaced his Trabbi with an expensive Mercedes Benz. As a result,
the risk exposure of Trabbi owners worsened, whence their insurance rates went up.
At that time, East-German owners of Mercedes Benz enjoyed low liability risk and
thereby favorable premiums. The implicit transfer from the first group to the second
contributed to the speedy change of the East-German car pool - and in part, to the
accelerated extinction of the infamous Trabbi.
Albeit rather unique, these events indicate some lack of e!ciency in quite common
liability rules, a lack that calls for closer analysis and maybe legal reform. Three in-
terrelated issues occupy center stage in this regard. One, already mentioned, concerns
monetary transfers from good to bad risks - a fairly frequent problem of insurance.
Corresponding author, Economics Department, University of Bergen, H. Foss gt 6, 5007 Bergen,
Norway; Email: sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no. Support from Finansmarkedsfondet and E.On Ruhrgas is
gratefully acknowledged.
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The second issue revolves around internalization of costs. Third, there is the question
whether established policies favor introduction of relatively expensive or heavy cars,
prone to suer or inflict great damage.
Insurance is modelled here as a mutual company. Given the collection of cars, liability
risks are pooled so as to provide e!cient and acceptable risk sharing. The availability
of such sharing, and its specific form, may, however, tilt the choice of automobile
toward species that cause large property losses.
To bring out that argument, the analysis below combines various concepts of game
theory. Risk sharing is a cooperative business, yielding a core solution that captures
all gains from exchange. In contrast, choice of car is non-cooperative - hence part of
Nash equilibrium in a large, anonymous game where every player behaves as though
he does not aect insurance premiums.
Thus aggregation operates twice, but at dierent levels: first, by the sharing of pooled
risks; second, by aecting vehicle choice via insurance premiums. Aggregation assures
existence of equilibrium at both levels. In fact, risk exchange between numerous
agents - each bringing a moderate-size, almost independent risk - easily generates
a price-supported core imputation. Further, since individual choice of vehicle has
negligible overall eects, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists under fairly weak
assumptions. In short, solutions are available, but they might be unstable, ine!cient,
or unfair.
To argue why, the paper is planned as follows. For motivation Section 2 depicts two
examples. Common to these are negative externalities caused by particular automo-
biles or drivers. Section 3 outlines a model in which vehicle acquisition depends on -
and aects - liabilities. Section 4 formalizes liabilities as random variables and casts
insurance as mutual. Thus policies and premiums become endogenous and built into
car owners’ objectives. Upon facing the pool of automobiles, each buyer chooses a
vehicle so as to maximize his reduced form of objective function. Section 5 considers
existence of pure Nash equilibrium. A few properties of such equilibrium are singled
out in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Motivating Examples
We consider property damage caused by collisions between cars. The chances of such
accidents - and the attending losses - depend on numerous factors, including tra!c
density and vehicle types. The following examples focus on liability and insurance,
but ignore personal injuries, supposing that each car perfectly protects its driver.1
1Some carmakers promise extra safety for drivers of their vehicles. It is hard, however, to protect
fully against material damages. In fact, there appears to be a tradeo between the two sorts of
protection.
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Example 2.1 (One Mercedes Benz among Trabbis) Suppose there is one quite ex-
pensive vehicle, called Mercedes. Further suppose its driver is so marvelously skilled
as to never cause any accident. Chances are, however, that other motorists, all cir-
culating in utterly cheap cars, will collide with the one and only Mercedes. Even the
lightest of such collisions causes very expensive repairs on that vehicle. Clearly, if
standard liability is in vigor, the Mercedes owner needs no insurance coverage. Yet
he exposes other motorists to greater risk. If liability insurance is mandatory, and
standard policies are oered at reasonably fair premiums, the owner of the excep-
tional car gets a bargain. Since all others suer, they might think tort and liability
law sorely in need of reform. Instead of standard liability they would prefer a pure
no fault regime, meaning one that merely covers damages on own car. 
Example 2.2 (One SUV among Trabbis) Now replace the Mercedes with a heavy,
quite solid car, called SUV. As before, all other vehicles are light and fragile. But
driving skills are reversed. That is, suppose no driver except the one who owns the
SUV can cause any accident. Whenever he collides, his vehicle suers negligible dam-
age but totally scraps the countering car. Clearly, only the exceptional driver needs
liability insurance. All others would vote for a standard liability regime which covers
damages inflicted on the other car. Otherwise compulsory insurance might appear
unfair and ine!cient. 
Thus, either liability regime, standard or no fault, produces undesirable incentives.
Common to these regimes is the negligence of vehicle brands and drivers’ behavior or
skills. In fact, after collision, liability issues mainly hinge upon damages and respon-
sibilities. Plainly, so narrow a perspective ex post induces distortions ex ante. While
a no fault regime favors cheap cars, the standard regime oers advantages for heavy
lorries and SUVs. To mitigate such lack of e!ciency and fairness it appears prudent
to condition liability on vehicle and driver type. A setting for doing so is spelled out
in Section 4. But first comes the main structure of our approach.
3. Structure of the Model
This section outlines the model, deferring details on liabilities to the subsequent sec-
tion. There are two stages, recursively connected and brought together in Section 5.
At the second stage, after cars have been chosen, liabilities are shared and insured.
At the first stage, while anticipating insurance premiums, each agent chooses a car.
We begin with the second stage.
Insurance. Automobile owners constitute a large ensemble A, comprising q mem-
bers, referred to as agents.2 For a start, suppose everybody has already chosen his
car. Agent d 5 A thereafter faces liability Od and gets expected utility Hxd([d) by
2If a household owns several autos, they could be assigned to dierent members.
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retaining risk [d and pays premium (Od  [d) for risk shed. Assume each utility
function xd(·) is concave, strictly increasing and, for now, state-independent.
Suppose agents measure utilities and liabilities in money, and regard either entity as
perfectly transferable. Accordingly, for the purpose of mutual risk-sharing, they
maximize
X
d
Hxd([d) subject to
X
d
[d 
X
d
Od>
and agree ex ante to evaluate state-contingent risk transfers by a shadow price density
S , associated to the above inequality. Thus, when (Od [d) = H [S · (Od [d)] >
agent d gets the net payo
d := sup
[d
H [xd([d) S · (Od [d)] = (1)
From Wilson (1968), the solution to this maximization problem has the following
properties:
Proposition 3.1 (On mutual risk-sharing)
• The sum
P
d d of net payos (1) depends only on the aggregate liability O :=P
d Od.
• Likewise, agent d gets a gross payo
d := sup
[d
H [xd([d) + S ·[d]
that depends only on the said aggregate O.
• Granted dierentiability and interior solutions, Borch’s (1962) rule holds:
S = x0d([d) for each d and optimal [d=
• If agents have the same utility function, their gross payos d coincide, and the
net payos d dier only in the gross premiums H [S · Od].
• Moreover, in that case, everyone retains the same share [d = O@q of the aggregate
liability. ¤
Acquisition of car. Stepping back to the first stage, suppose agent d contem-
plates to buy a vehicle from a finite list Y of dierent brands. Most likely, his choice
y 5 Y directly aects his utility function, as indicated by expressly writing xdy in lieu
of xd. Thus, with reference to (1), agent d should
maximize dy := sup
[d
H [xdy([d) S · (Od [d)] over Y= (2)
Our main interest is to establish existence of an equilibrium vehicle profile and explore
some of its properties. To address these issues we must spell out how agents interact.
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Doing so amounts to close and complete the model by describing how liabilities depend
on underlying data and the profile of automobile acquisitions.
Agents dier in type w 5 W and ownership of vehicle y 5 Y> the set W being fixed
and finite. Any type-vehicle combination f = (w> y) 5 W×Y= : C is referred to as a
characteristic. By slight abuse of notation, we write d 5 f to indicate that agent d is
of type wd> and owns a vehicle yd for which f = (wd> yd)= In principle, each characteristic
f = (w> y) is possible and perfectly observable. Further, characteristics are presumed
so informative as to preclude concerns with adverse selection.
Let qf be the number of car owners with characteristic f 5 C. These numbers define
a frequency distribution  = (f) := (qf@q) across C. In turn  - alongside the
liability regime - defines S , Od and how these variables are distributed. The links are
explained in the subsequent section.
For now, it su!ces to stress that individual objectives, defined in (2), depend on the
distribution = Accordingly, let dy() denote the expected net payo - or indirect
expected utility - that accrues to automobile owner d, upon choosing vehicle y> when
faced with distribution .
A pure strategy, vehicle profile d 5 A 7$ yd 5 Y> denoted (yd)> is declared a Nash
equilibrium i it generates a distribution  across C such that
dyd()  dy() for all d 5 A and y 5 Y= (3)
The crucial assumption behind this definition is that no single driver aects the
distribution  - or at least, each behaves as though he does not. Justification for
assuming so derives from the size of the car pool; drivers are in millions and of diverse
types, each type comprising thousands.3 In short: the game is large; every player
is anonymous and negligible; and interaction is perceived merely via aggregates; see
Schmeidler (1973).
Clearly, ownership of a single car precludes randomized use of several such objects.
Our interest is therefore with the existence and properties of pure equilibria. To
address these issues we must formalize liabilities next - and thereafter spell out how
insurance aects individual payos dy().
4. Liability and Insurance
This section deals with drivers’ behavior, liability, insurance, and indirect utility - in
that order. The aim is to outline how the function dy() in (3) could derive from
underlying, more primitive data.
3Clearly, if all drivers of some type opt to change vehicle, the distribution is aected. But
strategic coordination of such sort is neither plausible nor part of the setting.
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Behavior. Independent of each other, each automobile owner d 5 f equally ran-
domizes his driving behavior e across a fixed, finite set B. Whenever he is party to
a collision, suppose e is identifiable ex post. Such identification is likely to influence
the apportioning of fault and liability. And clearly, after-collision reconstruction of
behavioral modes helps mitigating moral hazards.
Liability. We consider automobile crashes that cause property damages. The basic
event is a collision between two cars from a closed pool. So, implicitly we deal with
a time span during which exactly one collision occurs.
There is a finite list D of possible damages, all measured in money and non-negative.4
Loss of life or limb is regarded as a separate insurance problem and hence not dealt
with. Alternatively, for the sake of a simpler argument, one may suppose that each
automobile oers perfect protection against personal injuries.
After any collision, by assumption, there is no doubt as to the agents involved, their
behaviors, characteristics, and damages.5 Correspondingly, whatever be the appor-
tioning of fault or liability, we assume that transaction costs be negligible. Put
dierently: by assumption, there are no litigation costs, and no return to eort, skill,
or time in filing a lawsuit.6
Formally, to realize - or simulate - a collision amounts to random draw of an outcome
$ = (d> e> f> g; d0> e0> f0> g0)
from the finite sample set l := (A × B× C×D)2. This particular draw, referred
to as state $ 5 l> means that agents d> d0 - with respective behaviors e> e0 and char-
acteristics f> f0 - have collided and thereby inflicted damages g> g0 on their vehicles.
Mentioning agent d first indicates that he caused the accident - maybe at fault, but
not intentionally.
One should think of state $ as the result of a hypothetical experiment - or simula-
tion - that proceeds in four steps: First, given the distribution > orderly select two
categories f> f0 5 C by their relative frequency and propensity to collide. Second,
randomize behavioral choices to find e> e0 5 B. Third, choose conditional damages g>
g0 5 D= Fourth, pick a culprit d 5 f in equiprobable manner and likewise a victim
d0 5 f0.
4There is no problem in letting D be an interval. However, by requiring D to be finite we avoid
some purely technical issues concerning measurability and integrability.
5By hypothesis, the concerned parties do not exaggerate or underestimate various damages. In
particular, they agree on what harms are too ephemeral, speculative or remote to merit compensa-
tion.
6Under a pure no fault system the driver would be barred from ever suing another driver for
damages. That system expressly intends to reduce the legal and administrative fees associated with
insurance claims.
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Thus the state set l is endowed with an objective probability measure, defining an
expectation operator H.7 Note that accident risk is construed as endogenous and
almost idiosyncratic. Systematic or exogenous risks - caused by say, the weather -
are presumed unimportant or constant, hence ignored.
Let X := Rl denote the linear space of contingent claims or liabilities. Any member
[ 5 X is a random variable $ 7$ [($). An automobile owner d 5 f who collides
with d0 5 f0 faces state-dependent liability
Od($) :=
;
?
=
L(e> f> g; e0> f0> g0) when $ = (d> e> f> g; d0> e0> f0> g0),
l(e> f> g; e0> f0> g0) when $ = (d0> e0> f0> g0; d> e> f> g)>
0 otherwise.
(4)
Plainly, Od belongs to X, and it depends on who caused the collision. But it does
not depend on the names d 5 f, d0 5 f0 of the colliding parties; only their behaviors,
characteristics and damages come into consideration.8 In particular, as long as d 5 f,
we may write Of instead of Od= Note that, unlike Shavell’s (1982) setting, care is
bilateral here, and both parties to a collision may suer direct liabilities.
Part of the rationale for liability is to deter reckless or criminal behavior. When e or
e0 qualify as such, Od typically contains an element of punishment. Liability may also
reflect on various psychological phenomena, be it diminished rationality, weakness of
will, or lack of attention.
In (4) the functions L> l : (B×C×D)2 $ R prescribe the expenses of the injurer
and the injured respectively. Typically, the forms of these indemnity functions L(·)
and l(·) are influenced by liability law and insurance institutions. Together the two
functions characterize and define the regime at hand.
Example 4.1 (Standard versus a no fault regime) Consider two disparate liabil-
ity regimes that are widely used. In the first, the culprit is responsible for the entire
damage g+ g0:
Od($) :=
½
g+ g0 if $ = (d> e> f> g; d0e0> f0> g0),
0 otherwise.
(standard)
The second regime holds each party responsible merely for the damage on the own
car:
Oˆd($) :=
;
?
=
g if $ = (d> e> f> g; d0> e0> f0> g0),
g if $ = (d0> e0> f0> g0; d> e> f> g)>
0 otherwise.
(no fault)
7Empirical estimates of that measure can be constructed from extensive data bases; see Chiappori
and Salanié (2000).
8Put dierently: although the insurance policy is written for its particular holder, by assumption,
when executed, it only invokes general structure, observable characteristics, and non-disputable
contingencies.
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Since
P
d Od =
P
d Oˆd, we get
P
d d =
P
d ˆd and S = Sˆ . Suppose utilities indepen-
dent of state and vehicle - and identical so that xd = x. Then, agents opt to retain
the same risk [d = O¯ :=
P
d Od@q= The price density becomes S = x0(O¯), giving
uniform gross payos
d = ˆd = Hx(O¯) +H
£
x0(O¯) · O¯
¤
for each d=
However, the dierence between net payos can become large. To see this, let A
comprise merely two agents: d> d0, owning vehicles y> y0> and suppose damages g> g0
are deterministic. Ex ante expectation is then taken over only three exclusive events,
namely: either one agent d or d0 causes an accident, presumed to happen with prob-
ability s A 0, or there is no mishap. Suppose g is significantly smaller than g0= Posit
g¯ = (g+ g0)@2 to get
dy  ˆdy = H
h
S · (Oˆd  Od)
i
= 2sx0(g¯)
£
gd  g¯
¤
>
and quite similarly for the other agent d0= Hence dy ? ˆdy and d0y0 A ˆd0y0. That
is, to no surprise, the owner of the more expensive car prefers the standard liability
regime over no fault.
As said, a problem with either regime is its negligence of car-driver characteristics.
A standard regime favors an expensive Mercedes Benz - and particularly so when its
driver is infallible. In contrast, no fault liability benefits the SUV - and especially so
when driven with little care. Either combination externalizes accident costs caused
by particular vehicles or drivers - and thus induces an undesirable profile of cars.
To indicate how one might mitigate these defects let y denote the value (or weight)
of the vehicle. Then, with d 5 f = (w> y)> d0 5 f0 = (w0> y0)> a hybrid regime
O˜d($) :=
;
?
=
g+ yy+y0g0 if $ = (d> e> f> g; d0> e0> f0> g0)>
y0
y+y0g0 if $ = (d0> e0> f0> g0; d> e> f> g)>
0 otherwise,
which covers portions of inflicted and suered damages, appears better at internaliz-
ing some accident costs caused by expensive or heavy vehicles. 
Real regimes dier in strictness and negligence standards. On the one hand, strictness
is embodied in (4). On the other, (e> e0) presumably determines the parties’ degree of
negligence. As is fairly well known, strictness and standards, alongside insurance, af-
fect drivers’ behavior; see Cohen and Dehejia (2004). We do not consider the strength
or nature of such mechanisms.9 Our focus is rather on the link between liability rules
and choice of vehicle. That link passes via insurance.
9Conversely though, the model accounts for the fact that behavior aects the frequency and
severity of accidents.
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Liability insurance.10 There are, of course, several ways to organize provision
and purchase of coverage. We choose to model the arrangement as a mutual com-
pany. Operation of that company largely depends on the vehicle profile (yd) in place.
Accordingly, for the remainder of this section fix (yd) and thereby the distribution =
For sake of greater generality and realism let utility now depend on the state. So,
xdy($> u) denotes the utility of agent d in state $> when driving vehicle y and getting
revenue u added to his wealth.11 If agent d opts to retain [d 5 X of his liability risk,
he gets expected utility Hxdy([d) := Hxdy($>[d($)) - the expectation being
taken with respect to $.12
Since the vehicle choice of each agent is fixed in this section, we write only xd instead
of xdyd = Further, to simplify arguments, in the main, suppose that utility be transferable
- whence referred to as payo. Accordingly, for any state $ 5 l and coalition D  A
let
u 5 R 7$ xD($> u) := sup
(X
dMD
xd($> ud) :
X
dMD
ud  u
)
denote the state-dependent, aggregate payo function, often assigned to a fictitious
agent declared representative.13 Our chief interest is with the grand coalition D = A
and the corresponding function xA($> ·), evaluated at aggregate liability O($) :=P
dMA Od($)=14
Naturally, each xd($> ·) hence xA($> ·) is increasing, but neither need be dierentiable.
To handle such objects, and to account for implicit constraints, if any, the following
generalized notion of dierentiability comes expedient. Given a function i from a
vector space Y into R^ {4}, a linear j : Y$ R is declared a supergradient of i at
| 5 Y> written j 5 Ci(|)> i i(|) is finite and
i(·)  i(|) + j(· |)=
10Liability - and associated insurance - often creates incentive problems and legal disputes. So, the
concept has a somewhat negative ring to it. Many di!cultes stem from requiring mainly one party
to pay attention and take precautions; see papers by Cooter, Priest, Shapiro and Winter (1991).
Tra!c accidents stand apart because care had better be bilateral.
11Agents need, however, not rank welfare according to final wealth. They might instead consider
appropriate reference levels and treat gains dierent from losses; see Safra and Segal (2008) or
references therein.
12As said, personal injuries are separate whence not considered. To ccount for them would require
inclusion of more states - and state-dependent utilities - that reflect on after-accident health, work
ability, or physical pain. Admittedly, the notion of pecuniary compensation for personal injuries is
rather problematic.
13For a nice presentation, see Magill and Quinzii (1996).
14Clearly, for this construction to make sense, liabilities must be perfectly divisible and - like
utilities - be transferable at no extra cost.
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In these terms, we call S 5 X a shadow price density i S ($) 5 CuxA($>O($)) for
each $ 5 l> where Cu denotes the partial subdierential. Note that when X = Rl
has inner product h{> {ˆi = H({ · {ˆ)> it holds S 5 CHxA(O) = [CuxA($>O($))]$Ml =
As already indicated in Example 4.1, a price density S structures risk-sharing. For
a more comprehensive and precise statement, let now OD :=
P
dMD Od denote the
aggregate liability for any coalition D  A=
Theorem 4.1 (On transferable utility, risk sharing, shadow price, and core solu-
tion, Evstigneev and Flåm (2001))
• Given a shadow price density S , the payo profile d 7$ d defined by (1) constitutes
a core allocation in the transferable-utility, cooperative game where coalition D  A
can secure itself expected payo HxD(OD)=
• A shadow price density exists when xA($> ·) is globally concave, and finite-valued at
O($) for each $ 5 l. If moreover, xA($> ·) is dierentiable at every O($)> then
the density is unique.
• For any shadow price density S> the allocation ([d) of the aggregate liability O is
optimal i Borch’s rule holds in the generalized, state-dependent form:
S ($) 5 Cuxd($>[d($)) for each d 5 A and $ 5 l=
• Conversely, if these inclusions hold, and
P
dMA[d = O> then S is a shadow price
density.
• Any shadow price density S decentralizes the choice of retained liability across
agents and events:
[d($) 5 argmaxuMR {xdyd($>u) + S ($) · u} for each d 5 A and $ 5 l= ¤
Indirect utility, a chief object in our analysis, now emerges forthwith:
Corollary 4.1 (Indirect utility) The joint distribution of Od and the shadow price
density S is determined by the underlying distribution = Thus, any agent d, upon
choosing vehicle y> foresees an indirect expected utility
dy() := sup
[d
H [xdy([d) S · (Od [d)] (5)
that depends only on = ¤
By hypothesis: each d 5 A regards  as unaected by himself. The optimal choice
of [d($) in (5) can be settled state by state. That is,
dy() := H

sup
uMR
{xdy($>u) + S ($) · u}
¸
H [S · Od] =
On Liability Insurance for Automobiles 11
The upshot is that core imputation (5) is the reduced payo function in (3).15 Note
that insurance policies and premiums are endogenous. Also note that the contingent
price S ($) depends on car-driver characteristics.
Onmarket-based insurance. It is appropriate to digress briefly and sketch another
construction of dy(·) - one that does not presume transferable utility. A retained
liability profile d 5 A 7$ [d 5 X, together with a price density S 5 X, constitutes a
competitive equilibrium iPd[d = O, where [d will
maxHxdyd([d) subject to H [S ·[d]  H [S · Od] = (6)
(6) models the insurance choice of agent d in a pure exchange economy where S ($) is
the Arrow-Debreu price for a claim to one unit of account in state $= For existence and
properties of such equilibrium see [1] and [8]. As above, to block arbitrage, pricing
H [S ·] must be linear on the space X of contingent claims. Clearly, the net insurance
premium H [S · (Od [d)] paid ex ante depends on manifold features of the vehicle
and its driver. Everything else equal, the distribution of S is determined by = So,
competitive equilibrium again yields indirect expect payo as in (5).
5. Equilibrium Choice of Car
The preceding sort of insurance is marked by anonymity. Likewise, the choice of car
defines a large game in which interaction works only via the distribution of choices.
This section considers existence of Nash equilibrium (3) in that game. We follow
Schmeidler (1973) and Rath (1992).16
Recall that any distribution  := (f) - alongside a liability regime - generates a profile
d 7$ Od defined by (4). In turn, that profile gives rise to at least one shadow price
density S= Further, taking Od and S as given, agent d chooses a vehicle
yd 5 argmaxy dy() = argmaxyMY
½
sup
[dMX
H [xdy([d) + S · ([d  Od)]
¾
=
Finally, the resulting vehicle profile (yd) defines a unique distribution  across C. This
string of connections, just outlined, is summarized next:
distribution  ; liability profile (Od) ; price density S ;
a set of vehicle profiles (yd) ; a set G() of distributions.
 is called an equilibrium distribution i  5 G()= Any such object belongs to the
standard simplex
{(C) :=
(
 5 RC+ :
X
fMC
f = 1
)
=
15This arrangement diers from the mutuals studied by Henriet and Rochet (1987) where fees are
flat and modified by lump sum transfers.
16For material on anonoymous games see Bergin (2005) and references therein.
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Note that G is a correspondence from {(C) into itself. For a precise definition of G,
denote by 1(f) the unit vector in RC that has 1 in component f> and zero elsewhere.
In these terms posit
G() := 1q
X
dMA
frqy {1(wd> yd) : yd 5 argmaxdy()} = (7)
Here q := #A is the number of agents; wd is the type of agent d; and frqy denotes
the operation of taking convex hull. That operation allows and reflects randomized
choice of vehicle.
Theorem 5.1 (Existence of equilibrium) Suppose each mapping  7$ dy() is con-
tinuous. Then a Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies if argmaxy dy() always
is single-valued.
Proof. The correspondence  ; G()> as defined here above, has closed graph
and convex, non-empty values. Hence it admits a fixed point alias an equilibrium
distribution  5 G()= Since yd := argmaxy dy() is always a singleton, we get a
pure Nash equilibrium, and  = G() =PdMA 1(wd> yd)@q= ¤
It suits the generality of argument, and the size of the player population, to ac-
commodate infinite agent sets. Moreover, in doing so, we shall dispense with the
assumption that vehicle choice be unique.
Regard A now as a measure space, endowed with sigma-algebra A and probability
measure gd= By a vehicle profile is meant a mapping d 5 A 7$ yd 5 Y such that
d 7$ 1(wd> yd) is measurable. It follows forthwith from Schmeidler [21]:
Theorem 5.2 (More on existence of equilibrium) Suppose each mapping  7$ dy()
is continuous. Now let (A, A, gd) be a non-atomic probability space. Assume
{d 5 A : wd = w} 5 A> and {d 5 A : dy() A dy0()} 5 A
when w 5 W> y> y0 5 Y> and  5 {(C)= Posit
G() :=
Z
A
{1(wd> yd) : yd 5 argmaxdy()} gd=
Then a Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies. ¤
On drivers’ behavior. For simplicity, we assumed that a driver’s behavior is de-
termined by his characteristics. Hence it has not been viewed as a decision variable.
It is conceivable though, that his utility depends directly on own behavior. If so,
behavioral choice becomes part of his strategy. This feature complicates matters.
Nonetheless, it could be incorporated rather easily along the following lines.
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Suppose all agents d 5 f have the same utility function xef, depending on own behavior
e and characteristic f. Suppose agents with characteristic f randomize their behavior
independently but identically, each using the same behavioral mix
 5 {(B) :=
(
 5 RB+ :
X
eMB
e = 1
)
=
Then, for any agent d 5 f = (w> y), replace (5) by
dy() := max max[d H [xef([d) S · (Od [d)] = (8)
Since Od = Of for all d 5 f> it follows that the optimal [d = [f= That is, those with
equal characteristics retain equal risk and pay the same premium. Using (8) instead
of the objective in (2), and
G() := 1q
X
fMC
X
dMf
frqy {1(wd> yd) : yd 5 argmaxdy()}
instead of (7), the fixed point argument in Theorem 5.1 still holds verbatim.
6. Some Properties of Equilibrium
Singled out in this section are some straightforward features of risk sharing and
acquisition of automobiles.
First, since the game is large, and risks are almost independent, one may, to good
approximation, regard aggregate liability as fairly constant. Then, in extremis, car
owners can fully protect themselves:17
Proposition 6.1 (No aggregate liability risk) Suppose aggregate liability O is con-
stant. Also suppose agents have strictly concave, state-independent utility functions.
Then, no agent carries any risk. That is, the optimal allocation ([d) of retained lia-
bility risk makes each [d constant. Moreover, the price density $ 7$ S ($) is constant
as well. These assertions hold even if utilities are not transferable.
Proof. By assumption there exists welfare weights d A 0 such that the equilib-
rium allocation of liability risk will
maximize
X
dMA
dHxdyd([d) subject to
X
dMA
[d  O=
Clearly, since O is constant, for any feasible allocation ([d) the corresponding mean-
value profile (H[d) remains feasible. Moreover, by risk aversion, xdyd(H[d) 
17This result goes back to Malinvaud (1972-3). For an extension see Cass et al. (1996).
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Hxdyd([d). In fact, if some [d is non-degenerate, that last inequality is strict. The
constancy of S follows from Borch’s rule. ¤
Proposition 6.2 (No aggregate risk makes a driver care for his expected liabil-
ity) Let aggregate liability O be constant. Suppose the utility of agent d is not directly
aected by his vehicle choice. Then he prefers the regime that yields smallest expected
liability HOd.
Proof. Since the aggregate loss is constant, so is S as well. Upon comparing one
liability instance Od with another Oˆd> agent d sees a dierence
dy  ˆdy = H
h
S · (Oˆd  Od)
i
= S ·
h
HOˆd HOd
i
= ¤
Since insurance is purchased at anonymous prices, one naturally expects that equi-
librium treats equal agents equally:
Proposition 6.3 (Equal treatment) Suppose two agents d> d0 have identical utility
functions: xdy(·) = xd0y(·) and are of the same type. Then, presuming they select the
same sort of vehicle, they carry the same liability: [d = [d0 and pay the same gross
premium: H [S · Od] = H [S · Od0 ] > hence d = d0 . ¤
The introduction alluded to dynamic aspects - and the instability of some situa-
tions. Invoking standard evolutionary arguments, we may state forthwith:
Proposition 6.4 (Vanishing inferior vehicles) Suppose all agents of type w have the
same utility function xw>y= Let (y |w) denote the frequency with which vehicle y is
chosen among agents of type w= Out of equilibrium, suppose the rate of change ˙(y |w)
in that frequency satisfies
˙(y |w) = iw>y(> w>y 
X
y0MY
(y0 |w)w>y0)>
featuring continuous functions iw>y which satisfy
P
y iw>y  0> iw>y(> u) = 0 / u = 0>
and vljq [iw>y(> u)] = vljq [u] = Then, in equilibrium, expected payo w>y is constant
across vehicles y for which (y |w) A 0= In particular, if two categories f = (w> y)>
f = (w> y0) give xf = xf0, but liabilities H [S · Of] ? H [S · Of0 ] respectively, then f0 will
disappear from the pool. ¤
7. Concluding Remarks
Automobile use is a major source of negative externalities - hence heavily regulated
and taxed; see Parry et al.(2007). Plainly, putting another vehicle on the road in-
creases those externalities. Our concern has been with a less recognized spill-over.
It stems from replacing vehicles, already on the road, by others, more expensive
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to collide with. Such replacement heightens other motorists’ liability for property
damages.
Upon dealing with such damages, liability law aims at compensating victims, deter-
ring injurers, and setting standards of behavior. Legal practice has, however, not
fully accounted for externalities associated with vehicle choice. Economic theory, in
contrast, ceaselessly advocates that costs better be internalized, and it recommends
arrangements that facilitate voluntary exchange. Faithful to those maxims, econo-
mists would advice that liability rules and insurance policies should reflect the choice
of vehicles. Characteristics f = (w> y), more prone to inflict or suer large damages,
should face less favorable liabilities, indemnities or premiums. Otherwise, the share
of vehicle brand y in the pool will be undesirably large.
In emphasizing this feature we have worked with reduced payos and ignored personal
injuries. Further, for simplicity, we assumed that, after a collision, there is perfect
information, complete solvency, and costless resolution of disputes.
Format (4) is general enough to account for manifold concerns. It can incorporate
deductibles and feature caps on punitive damages. Most important, it can reflect car-
driver characteristics. In designing a liability rule (4) it is prudent to pursue at least
two goals: compensation and deterrence - twin goals often in conflict. The regime
could and should, however, also incite drivers to choose vehicles so as to reduce the
frequency and severity of accidents. As customary, to that end it is expedient that
cost be internalized.
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